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Dr. J. Gregory Payne
Aquest assaig analitza l'estil de lideratge del presi-
dent Barack Obama des de la perspectiva base, de
persona a persona i de diplomàcia pública, ressal-
tant-ne la seva campanya victoriosa per la nomina-
ció i la seva elecció històrica enfront de John
McCain. Es fa servir el model de negociació COAST
de Rattan per il·luminar alguna cosa sobre l'ús de la
comunicació de Barack Obama com a expert en retò-
rica i com a agent del populisme electrònic en la
campanya transformativa del 2008, que podria
donar algunes pistes sobre el seu lideratge com a pre-
sident.
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ith the election of Barack Obama as the new President of
the United States, expectations are high not only in
America but also within the global village for a dramatic
change in the style of U.S. leadership.1 One of the many key areas
demanding immediate attention is: how will President-Elect
Obama plan to address the badly damaged image of the United
States worldwide?2
This essay will explore leadership characteristics of grass-
roots diplomacy as a preferred strategy of President Obama in hel-
ping regain the stature of the United States worldwide. These cha-
racteristics will be identified and discussed from a practical pers-
pective, with the latter being derived from the personal expe-
riences of the author3 as the co-founder of the first grassroots
effort in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on America, the Saudi
American Exchange.4 (See www.saudiamericanexchange.org).
Ratzan’s COAST model of negotiation will be presented as a
means to furthering understanding of communication’s crucial
role the leadership role advocated for the President-Elect.5 Prior to
this discussion, a synopsis of the historical backdrop will be pro-
vided, outlining factors and actions that have resulted in the low
image of the U.S.
What produced the historic negative image of the United
States worldwide?
Immediately, after the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.S. enjoyed
almost worldwide empathy and support. An example of such sup-
port was found in some of America’s most long-standing pockets
of dissent and opposition. Strong words of condemnation of the
attacks came from leaders in China, Russia, and even Cuba.6
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were frocked with ribbons across their immaculately tailored jac-
kets, with the emblazoned message, “We All Americans!”7 Suffice
it to say, there was much positive currency in support of America
at this most disruptive and tumultuous time in our history. Yet,
this support and empathy was short-lived.
Recent surveys in the U.S. and abroad suggest the world’s
only superpower to be suffering from an image problem of crisis
proportions.8 Much of this negative image is rooted in the ill fated
decision to launch a preemptive war in Iraq, as well as the “go-it-
alone” attitude that has characterized so many foreign policy deci-
sions of the outgoing Bush administration.9
The President’s bully pulpit admonition that “you are either
with or against us” alienated many governments and peoples wi-
thin the global sphere, who saw America embark on an unfamiliar,
non-collaborative path that many described as very much out of
the American character, and some described such behavior as
imperialist bullying. President Bush and Vice President Cheney,
along with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, comprised a well-orches-
trated rhetorical tripartite that provided a stark black and white
mediated reality of affairs daily perpetuated on Fox News and, all
too frequently, even in such mainstream media as The New York
Times.
It is worth noting that in his first interview since the elec-
tion of Barack Obama, President Bush told a CNN interviewer that
one of his regrets was the use of such bellicose rhetoric in the after-
math of 9/11.10 Such a revelation, albeit late in his term, is an
important lesson, especially for those on the Obama team prepa-
ring to take over the reigns of government. Be keenly aware of the
power of language in defining the situation, especially the use of
words and slogans with deep emotional meanings.
With the theoretical understanding of communication
scholar Kenneth Burke as context, the Obama Presidency must
carefully consider and deliberate on word choices in such crisis
situations. Words are symbols that act as behavioral directives
among audiences. Words unite publics and divide publics.11 The
President-Elect seems to have a clear understanding of the use and
abuse of words and rhetoric, considering his responses to crises
7 Ibid.
8 Huffington Post, October 30, 2008.
9 Ibid.
10 CNN, November 14, 2008.
11 Kenneth Burke. Grammar of Motives. University of California, 1969.
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within the campaign, such as the inflammatory and derogatory
language of his previous minister, the Rev. Jeremiah Wright.12
In addition to the proclivity to use pejorative and divisive
rhetoric, the Bush Administration also further damaged America’s
image by making unsubstantiated claims regarding foreign policy.
To support his preemptive war claim, President Bush assertively
argued the reason for this unprecedented foreign policy strategy in
the history of the United States was that Hussein possessed “wea-
pons of mass destruction,” which threatened the U.S. The argu-
ment was bolstered by the assertion of chief U.S. ally, Tony Blair,
former Prime Minister of Great Britain, that such weapons could
potentially reach London and his country in half an hour.13
The WMD claim was a persuasive argument the Bush admi-
nistration had doggedly argued, with the support of all its rhetori-
cal forces. One of the most convincing arguments was the now
embarrassing, yet highly media-covered, presentation by Colin
Powell at the United Nations in support of the war. Complete with
visual aids of transport capabilities of the Iraqis for such weapons
of mass destruction, Powell pressed hard in support of the decision
to attack Iraq due to the WMD rationale.14
Under-girding this claim for preemptive intervention was
that Saddam Hussein and Iraq were involved in the 9/11 attacks
on American, which in fact was unsubstantiated and discredited
by credible sources, but continuously repeated as truth by Vice
President Cheney and echoed on Fox News.
The “allies” in support of the Iraqi war proved to be a rela-
tively small group, but fervently determined to carry out Bush’s
plan, even amidst worldwide protests against the U.S. led effort.
History would show such support of the war to have negative and
severe feedback from growing numbers of the global publics op-
posed to Iraq War. President José María Aznar, the leader in Spain,
was defeated after the Madrid bombing.15 This Spanish election
ushered in a new era in political communication technology, as
Spaniards utilized text messaging in the latter days of the cam-
paign to counter the governments’ claims broadcast on the tradi-
tional media that the bombings were linked to ETA, the national
12 Shailagh Murray and Peter Murray. “A Minister Repeats Comments, Obama
Tries to Quiet Fray”. Washington Post.com, April 29, 2008.
13 Ronan Thomas, “Act II for Tony Blair”. Asia Times (HYPERLINK
<http://www.atimescom> www.atimescom), June 23, 2007.
14 New York Times. “Colin Powell”. November 19, 2008.
15 BBC News. “Spanish government admits defeat”. March 15, 2004.
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terrorist organization lobbying for the independence of the Basque
region from Spain.
The Spanish voting public —involved via text technology at
the grassroots, people-to-people level— had another perspective as
to the origin of the attacks, and concluded the bombings were com-
mitted by Al Qaeda, as a response to Spain’s involvement in the
Iraq War. Aznar surprisingly suffered a defeat for re-election, and
Spain’s new socialist leader eventually pulled its troops from Iraq.16
Leadership Style in the Presidential Primaries - Iraq as a ligh-
tening rod issue for Candidate Obama and his grassroots, peo-
ple-to-people movement
In the United States presidential campaign, it was candidate
Obama’s opposition to the war in Iraq that provided the Illinois
Senator with a distinguishing and definitive characteristic that dif-
ferentiated him from then front-runner Senator Hillary Clinton,
and other candidates like former Senator John Edwards, Senator
Joe Biden, among others. It was this opposition to the war that
provided Obama with an important connection to the voters in
the first presidential contest —the Iowa Caucuses. Being against an
increasingly unpopular war resonated among the Iowa voters.17
Within this context, Senator Obama displayed an important
component of public diplomacy; he created meaningful relation-
ships among targeted public using the Internet and other people-to-
people platforms. At this time in the campaign, the Iraq War was
the most salient issue on the minds of the American voters, and it
was especially important to Iowa voters. Obama found his voice and
stage with his anti-war stance. He restated his leadership in oppo-
sing the war in “personal” e-mails sent to voters to enhance his rela-
tionship and dialogue with them. Complementing this electronic
populism were surrogates and advocates of the Obama field team,
on the ground in the towns and cities of Iowa, who continued to
develop the Obama connection with voters, by stressing the Illinois
Senator’s leadership positions on issues.18
Candidate Obama emphasized his opposition to the war as
an indelible part of his credibility and judgment in comparison
16 ORDEIX-RIGO, E. (2005). Aznar’s Political Failure or Punishment for
Supporting the Iraq War? Hypotheses About the Causes of the 2004 Spanish Election
Results. American Behavioral Scientist, 49(4), p. 610-615.
17 CNN. “Obama wins Iowa as candidate of change”. January 4, 2008.
18 BBC. “Internet key to Obama victories”. June 12, 2008.
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to the front-runner, Hillary Clinton, who voted to support the
war. It was the most important issue at this time in the cam-
paign, and the value of Obama’s honesty resonated within the
electorate.
The symbolic and historical associations of the Obama cam-
paign narrative also help establish the candidate’s ethos. It should
be remembered that Senator Obama launched his presidential
campaign on the steps of the Old Illinois State Capitol in
Springfield, on the very site that Abraham Lincoln had announced
his candidacy for president almost a century and a half prior. It
was President Lincoln who signed the Emancipation
Proclamation, which freed the slaves in America, the major issue
in the Civil War. Now, as a result of Lincoln’s foresight and deter-
mination, as well as hard work of individuals like Martin Luther
King and others in the Civil Rights Movement, a black man of
mixed dissent, the Christian son of a Muslim father, was a serious
candidate for President of the United States. Once again, as it was
with Lincoln, an Illinois Senator’s honesty and eloquence were
persuasive to the American voting public, initially in Iowa. The
open and honest style of communication, a prerequisite for effec-
tive public diplomacy, was an essential component of the Obama
campaign approach.19
Even with the double-digit lead she enjoyed as the front-
runner for the nomination, Senator Hillary Clinton was forced to
be on the defense on the Iraq war issue, which directly questioned
the validity of the experience argument that she used as a strong
argument for her candidacy over Senator Obama. In debates
throughout the primary and caucus campaign, Obama countered
Clinton’s claim of his being naïve and her being experienced. He
pointed out that if Clinton’s experience meant that she was on the
wrong side on important issues like Iraq, it had no real value to
voters who wanted and deserved better judgment to meet the cha-
llenges now facing America. Obama emerged as a very effective
and charismatic orator, with rhetorical skills that helped him
vividly outline his vision and achieve consensus with various tar-
get audiences, who differed on specific issues, but who were loo-
king for a leader who could stress common values. Such commu-
nication skills are also essential for the public diplomacy advocate
facing disparate publics with competing interests.20
19 Ibidem.
20 Scott Ratzan. “Political Communication as Negotiation”.
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The mediated reality of the local, national and international
campaign coverage in Iowa focused on this difference between
Obama and the other candidates, and helped propel Obama for-
ward in the polls, as a legitimate and creditable candidate. Of
equal, if not of more importance, was his historic use of social net-
works and the Internet to connect with voters at the grassroots
level. Such communication platforms and new media strategies
also provide rich opportunities in public diplomacy efforts world-
wide. Obama’s victory in the Iowa caucus, and Clinton’s distant
third place energized his campaign and quickly established Obama
to be, if not the front-runner, a force no one had considered as a
credible candidate prior to the first caucus victory.
Without this notable asset early on in the extended primary
and caucus process —of being the only candidate running for presi-
dent of the United States who had opposed the Iraqi War— one
could legitimately doubt that Barack Obama would be able to rise
above the numerous Democratic candidates running for the presi-
dency. Nonetheless, his principled stance from the very beginning
of being against the war —of having the judgment to see through
the sham arguments brought forward in support of the preemptive
strike, not only positioned him in a unique position in the early pri-
maries, but also provided valuable insights into his leadership style.
The Obama Presidency: What he can do to help improve the
U.S. Image
One of the major themes of candidate Obama during his historic
campaign was that he would be a president who valued two-way
communication and dialogue over confrontation and unidirectio-
nal edicts. This was a welcome message to many Americans, and
most of the world publics who favored a means of conflict resolu-
tion rather than force, which many identified as the major stra-
tegy of the Bush administration. Such a pugnacious leadership
strategy of the Bush administration —America with a Big Stick—
had not only failed to achieve its desired results in Iraq and other
strategic venues, it had alienated friends and foes alike. America’s
image was lower than it had been during the tumultuous race riots
of 1960s.21
The Bush bravado would be replaced, according to Obama,
with collaboration not confrontation, among our friends, and
21 Nancy Snow. “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Its History, Problems and Promise”.
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potential negotiation among our foes, in an attempt to find mea-
ningful and non-violent resolutions to problems. In his campaign
rhetoric, the Illinois Senator pointed out that this direct commu-
nication approach would not rule out the use of force ultimately
if needed, but that it would be used as a last resort. The first step
in conflict resolution would be to define the conflict and to
attempt to understand the opposition’s perspectives through a
collaborative and on-going dialogue.
This outlook illustrates the insights provided by Dr. Scott
C. Ratzan in his work on negotiation and conflict resolution.
Ratzan’s communication-based COAST model identifies the basic
components and strategies of conflict resolution and negotiation:
Communication, Options, Alternatives, Standards and Trust.
According to Ratzan, it is through an open and direct communi-
cation act that the divergent parties can establish common
ground and begin to identify creatively the potential options that
might be explored to resolve the conflict. From this list of options
—which is a mere listing of all possible means to end the con-
flict— without any values or priorities —the two parties would
then examine the best alternatives that meet the needs and
expectations of both parties.22
Such an approach to conflict resolution shares many simi-
larities with the leadership mandates of grassroots public diplo-
macy. From this ground floor, people-to-people approach, advo-
cates attempt to find similarities in over-arching values and
beliefs among the divergent publics that transcend the differen-
ces. The objective with such open talks and discussion is to build
the foundation for trust and cooperation among the parties and
publics.
Rooted in the communication process, grassroots public
diplomacy approaches a crisis situation as one in which both
agents are intricately involved in the communication process. The
sender and the receiver willfully engage in meaningful contact and
exchange of messages. In such communication encounters, lan-
guage is appreciated as symbolic, with both sides deriving different
meanings and interpretations based on their history in politics,
religion, economics and education, among other factors.23
22 Scott Ratzan. “Political Communication as Negotiation”.
23 Gene Klan, Crisis Leadership, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboror,
North Washington Times, Nov. 19, Helle Dale. “DALE: Public Diplomacy
Expectations, Complete Across the Board Reform”. Huffington Carolina, 2003.
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The goal in such deliberative communication encounters is
not necessarily to agree on all issues, but to begin the conversation
and further the understanding among the conflicting parties. As
the communication continues to develop in such open public
diplomacy efforts, areas of difference are better understood within
among those agents involved. With more trust among the parties,
one learns to begin to accept, where possible, differences in pers-
pectives, as one further explores areas where there is a agreement
and shared values.
But even with these recognized differences, the impetus in
public diplomacy is to begin communication between the dispa-
rate parties. This essential communication act must take place
against all odds and conflicting forces, and within a context of
competing agendas, strong, loud and dominant voices and inte-
rests in opposition to such communication encounters for a
variety of reasons and rationales. It is incumbent that leadership
push ahead and remove the roadblocks constructed to impede
such communication acts. This is necessary for the initiation and
eventually nurturing of the establishment of relationships and
trust between the opposing sides. Even if only symbolic in the
beginning, contact between the two parties is the primary essen-
tial step to begin the dialogue.
Leadership Lessons in Public Diplomacy - The Saudi American
Exchange
An example of such an approach is one in which the author has
personal knowledge —the formation of the Saudi American
Exchange, the first grassroots effort in the wake of 9/11—. On the
day of the attacks, a conversation between a former student, Prince
Faisal F. Al Saud, and myself acknowledged the great and growing
gap between our two countries, given the events of September 11.
Fifteen of the eighteen hijackers were Saudis, and the horrific attack
had immediately polarized people around the world.
But even in such a troubled context, I myself as an American
and Faisal as a Saudi both pledged to talk the next day, and to con-
tinue our dialogue to work toward finding ways to bring Americans
and Saudis together. After a personal visit by me to Saudi Arabia
two months after the attacks, we agreed to start the Saudi American
Exchange and planned its first activity with the help of Mohamed
Khalil, a colleague of Faisal’s and graduate of the Kennedy School
at Harvard, —a visit of 25 college students to Saudi Arabia in March
of 2002.
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There were distinct differences between the two counties
that would be difficult, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, to over-
come. The initial conversations were sometimes short, direct and,
at times, confrontational as both sides explored the verification
and refutation of commonly held stereotypes. The important
point was that communication was initiated, and most of those
participants involved were willing to continue with the dialogue.
Yet, the trip and the direct contact, which planted the seeds
necessary for the development of meaningful relationships formed
between the participants, began to nurture a trust and openness to
notice what we shared in common, love of family, faith, food.
More importantly, the direct communication invited a willingness
to respect differences, as the participants from both sides further
explored their roots and ramifications. The result has been an on-
going and sustained public diplomacy program based on mea-
ningful dialogue and understanding.
In this first trip, many of the mediated stereotypes that were
dominantly presented in the media of both East and West were refu-
ted with personal first-hand contact. Upon their return to the
United States, many of the students became advocates of such grass-
roots efforts. Newspaper articles and television interviews chroni-
cled the personal visits and impressions of those who had made the
trip. Lectures and speeches, and even debates on reality versus ste-
reotypes perpetuated in the media were scheduled in various parts
of America. Virtual meetings, conferences and forums were held
among the U.S. participants and their Saudi counterparts.
The target groups for this exchange have included students
from colleges and universities from urban and rural areas of
America. It has included students from Harvard and Yale as well as
students from Southern Illinois University and Rend Lake
Community College. It has included students not only from
America and Saudi Arabia, but students and working professionals
from Spain, France, Portugal, Germany, China, Bahrain, Jordan,
Iraq, among others. Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Jews,
Buddhists and atheists have participated. The Saudi American
Exchange has sponsored events, contests, summer internship pro-
grams and special events that have brought thousands of people
together in person and on line. Regardless of the communication
platform, the objective has been the same —to engage in dialogue
and to pursue at the grassroots level what similarities and cha-
llenges we have as common neighbors in the global village.
There is evidence that the Bush administration recognized,
albeit late, the importance of public diplomacy as an important
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tool in helping bridge the gaps between nations, cultures and peo-
ples. There have been more exchange programs, but there are
inherent challenges to the approach. One problem with the Bush
approach has been the definition of public diplomacy as grass-
roots, people-to-people strategy to communicate and clarify its
foreign policy objectives. President Obama would be better served to
leave the clarification of foreign policy to his diplomatic crop in
the State Department. My experience in public diplomacy, espe-
cially in problematic areas such as U.S. Saudi relations, is to focus
on the communication of American values, rather than foreign
policy objectives. This approach relieves those involved with the
stigma that such efforts that are governmentally based have an
inherently political and propagandistic objective. A second issue
with many of the current public diplomacy initiatives is the ten-
dency for the Americans to do the talking, rather than actively lis-
tening to the interests and concerns of the other side, and adjus-
ting the message accordingly. The idea of one side having the ans-
wer, and that one size fits all in terms of message is a passé and
ineffective approach of the Bush administration that President
Obama must abandon when he takes office. 
Given the erudite grassroots, people-to-people strategy of
President-Elect Obama in winning the 2008 election, he has
unmatched ability to be an effective and credible advocate of
public diplomacy on the world stage. As America’s first president
with mixed racial backgrounds, he epitomizes the American dream
to millions worldwide. President Obama, the person, is a very
strong symbol of change and inclusion to publics around the
world, prior to him saying one word. This is a very distinctive and
important first step in overcoming the current negative image of
the U.S. Employing this approach and combining it with the ever-
expanding technological toolbox to connect people worldwide,
the Obama Administration is challenged to continue to do world-
wide what it did so effectively in the 2008 presidential campaign
—connect people together in the pursuit of values and goals that
unite us as a global people.
